We use a dynamic adjustment model and panel methodology to investigate the determinants of a time-varying optimal capital structure. Because firms may temporarily deviate from their optimal capital structure in the presence of adjustment costs, we also endogenize the adjustment process. In...

This paper analyzes capital structure determinants of UK and continental European firms. Besides considering firmspecific characteristics, it investigates the impact of different corporate governance related institution- and marketspecific aspects on the capital structure choice. The dynamic...

We analyze the heterogeneity in asset allocation decisions of different investor groups in response to changes in the macroeconomic environment. Using a new data set that includes the monthly portfolio holdings of private, commercial, and institutional investors deposited with Swiss banks, we...

New liquidity rules phased in under Basel III define the new net stable funding ratio (NSFR) to promote sustainable funding structures at financial institutions. In this paper, we analyze characteristics and drivers of NSFR for a sample of 921 Western European banks between 1996 and 2010. We...

Using a broad bank-level dataset and the GMM estimator technique described by Arellano and Bover (1995), this paper analyses how bank-specific characteristics, macroeconomic variables, and industry-specific factors affect the profitability of 10,165 commercial banks across 118 countries over the...

Our paper investigates the geographical distribution of physicians across the Swiss cantons over the years 1960 to 2005. We use a physician location model relating physician growth in a canton related to (i) the existing number of physicians in an area, (ii) commonly used determinants of the...

This paper analyzes the geographical distribution of physicians across the 26 cantons of Switzerland from 1960 to 1998. We use a dynamic location model to explain physicians' choice for their practices by considering market characteristics and medical infrastructure. Our panel data analysis...

We consider a signaling model with a good and a bad type of firm. The market does a priori not know the firm's type. The firms, which are run by equally qualified managers, can use their debt level to signal their true value to the market. In addition to debt, the manager chooses his effort...

Our paper is a further contribution to the still very small empirical literature on the effects of competition on managerial incentive schemes. Based on a theoretical model that incorporates both strategic interaction between firms and a principal agent relationship, we investigate the...