We analyze the limit behavior of sequences of oligopolistic equilibria in which firms follow objectives consistent with their shareholders' interests. We show that the efficiency of the limit allocation depends on how firms' shares are distributed across consumers, and provide a characterization...

We present some complementary results to Bidian and Bejan (2012). Part 1 provides necessary and sufficient transversality conditions for an agent's optimization problem. They are extensions to stochastic environments of the conditions given by Kocherlakota (1992), or alternatively, extensions to...

Rational bubbles are believed to be fragile and unable to explain the trading frenzy associated to price run-ups. With limited enforcement of credit contracts and endogenous debt limits designed to prevent default and allow for maximal credit expansion, a large class of bubbles can be introduced...

We show that an intrinsic property of a large class of rational bubbles is their capacity to relax the agents’ debt limits. Any bubble that preserves the set of pricing kernels, or equivalently, the asset span, has effectively an identical effect on consumption and real interest rates as an...

We analyze the limit behavior of sequences of oligopolistic equilibria in which firms follow objectives consistent with their shareholders’ interests. We show that convergence to a competitive outcome may fail for some distributions of firms’ shares across consumers and provide a...

This paper proposes a model of an incomplete markets economy with pro- duction, in which the firm acts as financial innovator by issuing claims against its stock. The firm’s objective is to maximize its adjusted value, which is the sum of the market value and the shareholders’ surplus from...

We give an axiomatization of the aspiration core on the domain of all TU-games using a relaxed feasibility condition, non-emptiness, individual rationality, and generalized versions of the reduced game property (consistency) and superadditivity. Our axioms also characterize the C-core (Guesnerie...

Any TU-game can be generated from a production economy with indivisible labor inputs. An equilibrium of that economy always exists after a central intervention that taxes income and subsidizes production. The set of equilibrium allocations corresponding to the smallest income tax coincides with...

This work uses the defining principles of the core solution concept to determine not only payoffs but also coalition formation. Given a cooperative transferable utility (TU) game, we propose two noncooperative procedures that in equilibrium deliver a natural and nonempty core extension, the...