This paper examines a two-stage competition where firms simultaneously choose the number of products and qualities in the first stage, and then compete in prices. It is shown that a monopolist must sell a single product. In addition, in any equilibrium of multiproduct duopoly, there are...

The paper investigates a two-stage competition in a vertical differentiated industry, where each firm produces an arbitrary number of similar qualities and sells them to heterogeneous consumers. We show that, when unit costs of quality are increasing and quadratic, each firm has an incentive to...

The paper investigates a two-stage competition in a vertical di¤erentiated industry, where each …firm produces an rbitrary number of similar qualities and sells them to heterogeneous consumers. We show that, when unit costs of quality are increasing and quadratic, each …firm has an incentive...

This article proposes a Cournot model of two-stage competition to examine the patterns of vertical product differentiation in a multiproduct duopoly. Firms simultaneously choose the number of products and their qualities at the first stage and compete in quantities at the second stage. We show...

Most existing models of spatial agglomeration economics do not include the effects of the governmental sector in an urban configuration, although the governmental sector plays an important role in economic activity. We discuss how an exogenous distribution of locations of governmental facilities...

We propose location-then-variety competition for amulti-productandmulti-store oligopoly,in which the number of firms, the number of stores and their location, and the number of varieties are endogenously determined. We show that ascompared to price-then-variety competition, location-then-variety...

This paper demonstrates that a pollution tax with a fixed cost component may lead, by itself, to stratification between clean and dirty firms without heterogeneous preferences or increasing returns. We construct a simple model with two locations and two industries (clean and dirty) where...

This paper demonstrates that a pollution tax with a fixed cost component may lead, by itself, to stratification between clean and dirty firms without heterogeneous preferences or increasing returns. We construct a simple model with two locations and two industries (clean and dirty) where...