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We study the relation between formal incentives and social exchange in organizations where employees work for several managers and reciprocate a manager’s attention with higher effort. To this end we develop a common agency model with two-sided moral hazard. We show that when effort is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005406384
<Para ID="Par1">This study analyses how various internationalization modes affect innovation in ten transition economies. Using propensity score matching to account for selection, we match firms on size, sector, and country. A key contribution is that firms are also matched based on the heterogeneity of...</para>
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011241891
This paper explores the connection between the external opening of China and differences in innovation across Chinese regions. For the period 1995–2010, we find that regions that attract inward foreign direct investment (FDI) and exports have become more innovative. Further, we show a U-shaped...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010894905
We study optimal incentive contracts for workers who are reciprocal to management attention. When neither worker's effort nor manager's attention can be contracted, a double moral-hazard problem arises, implying that reciprocal workers should be given weak financial incentives. In a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005018695
We study optimal incentive contracts for workers who are reciprocal to management attention. When neither worker's effort nor manager's attention can be contracted, a double moral-hazard problem arises, implying that reciprocal workers should be given weak financial incentives. In a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008506073
We study the relation between formal incentives and social exchange in organizations where employees work for several managers and reciprocate to a manager's attention with higher effort. To this end we develop a common agency model with two-sided moral hazard. We show that when effort is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136973
We study optimal incentive contracts for workers who are reciprocal to management attention. When neither worker's effort nor manager's attention can be contracted, a double moral-hazard problem arises, implying that reciprocal workers should be given weak financial incentives. In a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005137227
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005298303
This article analyses negative externalities that policy makers in one region or group may impose upon the citizens of neighbouring regions or groups. These externalities may be material, but they may also be psychological (in the form of envy). The latter form of externality may arise from the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005207922
We empirically investigate the factors that drive the uneven regional distribution of foreign direct investment (FDI) across Chinese provinces from 1995 to 2006. We first perform a factor analysis to summarize information embodied in around 40 variables and derive four FDI determinants:...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009219108