We study the problem of assigning a set of objects to a set of agents, when each agent receives one object and has strict preferences over the objects. In the absence of monetary transfers, we focus on the probabilistic rules, which take the ordinal preferences as input. We characterize the...

We study a probabilistic assignment problem when agents have multi-unit demands for objects. We first introduce two fairness requirements to accommodate different demands across agents. We show that each of these requirements is incompatible with stochastic dominance efficiency (henceforth, we...

A group of agents are waiting for their job to be processed in a facility. We assume that each agent needs the same amount of processing time and incurs waiting costs. The facility has two parallel servers, being able to serve two agents at a time. We are interested in finding the order to serve...

In this note we consider a society that partitions itself into disjoint jurisdictions, each choosing a location of its public project and a taxation scheme to finance it. The set of public project is multi-dimensional, and their costs could vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. We impose two...

In this paper we consider an urban population represented by a continuum of individuals uniformly distributed over the real line that faces a problem of location and financing of multiple public facilities. We examine three notions of stability of emerging jurisdiction: stability under...