In this paper we characterize the equilibrium of a duopoly market which exhibits advertising spillovers. Interestingly, we prove that the relevant distinction is not between pure positive and pure negative advertising spillovers but between strong positive spillovers and weakly positive or...

In this paper, we study a simple model in which two horizontally differentiated firms compete in prices and targeted advertising on an initially uninformed market. First, the Nash equilibrium is fully characterized. We prove that when the advertising cost is low, firms target only their...

The labor market is introduced into the standard vertical differentiation model, linking increasingly the quality of the product and the effort necessary for workers to produce it. Surprisingly, when two firms compete on the product market but are monopolies on the labor market, at equilibrium...

A theoretical model is considered in a monopoly setting, where the production cost of the firm depends on the efforts of employees who may receive a positive part of the capital if the shareholders find profitable to do so. We specify the condition under which at Nash equilibrium the firm...

We propose to study the trade off between two incentive strategies (moni- toring and efficiency wage versus profit sharing), operated by one firm to induce more efforts among employees. We deal first with a normal context where shirkers bear the risk to be fired. We consider second a particular...

The results previously obtained on the finiteness property in vertically differentiated markets, with cost functions having increasing or decreasing returns, are extended to a much larger class of cost functions with local properties in a vicinity of the zero output. Moreover, existence results...

This paper suggests a modelling of the labelling procedure consistent with empirical observations, that allows the endogenous calculation of labelling criteria. The authority in charge of the labelling program chooses the level of labelling criteria so as to maximise the social surplus,...

We characterize the equilibrium of a game in vertically differentiated market which exhibits network externalities. There are two firms, an incumbent and a potential entrant. Compatibility means in our model that the inherent qualities of the goods are close enough. By choosing its quality, the...

This paper considers a vertical differentiation model with positive network effects. It is based on the assumption that consumers belong to the same network if they buy products exhibiting close characteristics. Thus, the network has two characteristics: its intensity and its selectivity. The...