Author: Edward J. Anderson, Pär Holmberg and Andrew B. Philpott Keywords: Pay-as-bid Auction; Divisible Good Auction; Mixed Strategy Equilibria; Wholesale Electricity Markets Pages: 71 Published: November 24, 2009 JEL-codes: D43; D44; C72 Download Wp814.pdf (756 kB) Abstract Using the concept of...

This paper discusses the way that different operational characteristics including existing capacity, scale economies, and production policy have an important influence on the capacity outcomes when firms compete in the market place. We formulate a game-theoretical model where each firm has an...

In this paper we analyse the equilibrium structure for a particular type of electricity market. We consider a market with two generators offering electricity into a pool. Generators are centrally dispatched, with cheapest offers used first. The pool price is determined as the highest-priced...

In this paper we analyse the equilibrium structure for a particular type of electricity market. We consider a market with two generators offering electricity into a pool. Generators are centrally dispatched, with cheapest offers used first. The pool price is determined as the highest-priced...

In this paper we give some extensions of a result of Nevison and Burstein (Nevison, C. H., M. Burstein. 1984. The dynamic lot-size model with stochastic lead times. Management Sci. 30 100--109.), who discuss a dynamic lot-sizing model with stochastic lead times. They consider a situation in...

Generators in a wholesale electricity market can exercise market power, but the existence of forward hedging contracts between consumers and generators mitigates this market power. In our model we look at the role of the consumers (retailers here) in offering forward contracts. To deal with the...