The fixed-price-offer (FPO) mechanism in <italic>Trade Me</italic> auctions allows sellers to make a take-it-or-leave-it offer at the conclusion of an unsuccessful auction. Weinvestigate the effects of the FPO option on strategies and outcomes in independent-value auctions. The FPO option induces some bidders...

The Fixed Price Offer (FPO) mechanism in Trade Me auctions allows sellers to make a take-it-or-leave-it offer at the conclusion of an unsuccessful auction. We investigate the effects of the FPO option on strategies and outcomes in independent-value auctions. The FPO option induces some bidders...

This article is concerned with models in which an agent faces a lottery with <italic>j</italic> other agents for a prize, so that the probability of winning the prize is 1/(<italic>j</italic> + 1), and where <italic>j</italic> is stochastic. After describing four different situations where such a lottery is present, we construct the expected...

Consider a model in which a consumer faces a lottery with j other people for a prize, so that the probability of winning the prize is 1/(j+1). Now let j be a random variable, determined by the binomial distribution. Specifically, let there be n potential competitors for the consumer in the...

In a standard English auction in which bidders’ valuations are independently drawn from a common distribution, a standard regularity condition is that the survivor function of the distribution be log concave. In an auction where the seller sets a fixed price, the equivalent condition requires...

This study analyzes the impact of government efforts to increase agricultural incomes on income inequality in rural China. It collects and analyzes survey data from 473 households in Yunnan, China in 2004. In particular, it investigates the effects of government efforts to promote improved...

We examine a duopoly pricing game where some customers know of no firms, others know of only one firm, and some know of both firms. Firms have constant and identical marginal costs, sell homogenous goods and choose prices simultaneously. Customers observe the prices of the firms that are known...

We analyze three potential solutions to the spamn problem - sender pays pricing, receiver pays pricing and filtering - used alone or concurrently. We find that filters alone may exacerbate the spam problem if the spammer tries to evade them by sending multiple variants of the message to each...

We examine a two stage duopoly game in which firms advertise their existence to consumers in stage 1 and compete in prices in stage 2. Whenever the advertising technology generates positive overlap in customer bases the equilib- rium for the stage 1 game is asymmetric in that one firm chooses to...