type="main" <title type="main">ABSTRACT</title> <p>Can managers influence the liquidity of their firms’ shares? We use plausibly exogenous variation in the supply of public information to show that firms actively shape their information environments by voluntarily disclosing more information than regulations mandate and...</p>

We provide evidence for the importance of information asymmetry in asset pricing by using three natural experiments. Consistent with rational expectations models with multiple assets and multiple signals, we find that prices and uninformed demand fall as asymmetry increases. These falls are...

We show that firms' idiosyncratic volatility in returns and cash flows obeys a strong factor structure. We find that the stocks of firms with large, negative common idiosyncratic volatility (CIV) factor betas earn high average returns. The CIV beta quintile spread is 6.4% per year. To explain...

Investors in option markets perceive the financial sector to be too-systemic-to-fail. They price in a substantial collective government bailout guarantee, which puts a floor on the value of the financial sector as a whole, but not on its individual members. The guarantee makes put options on the...

We propose a network model of firm volatility in which the customers' growth rate shocks influence the growth rates of their suppliers, larger suppliers have more customers, and the strength of a customer-supplier link depends on the size of the customer firm. Even though all shocks are i.i.d.,...

We examine the pricing of financial crash insurance during the 2007-2009 financial crisis in U.S. option markets. A large amount of aggregate tail risk is missing from the price of financial sector crash insurance during the financial crisis. The difference in costs of out-of-the-money put...

We empirically analyze the pricing of political uncertainty, guided by a theoretical model of government policy choice. After deriving the model's predictions for option prices, we test those predictions in an international sample of national elections and global summits. We find that political...

We empirically analyze the pricing of political uncertainty, guided by a theoretical model of government policy choice. After deriving the model's predictions for option prices, we test those predictions in an international sample of national elections and global summits. We find that political...

We propose a network model of firm volatility in which the customers' growth rate shocks influence the growth rates of their suppliers, larger suppliers have more customers, and the strength of a customer-supplier link depends on the size of the customer firm. Even though all shocks are i.i.d.,...

Theoretical asset pricing models routinely assume that investors have heterogeneous information. We provide direct evidence of the importance of information asymmetry for asset prices and investor demands using plausibly exogenous variation in the supply of information caused by the closure or...