Decision makers are often described as seeking higher expected payoffs and avoiding higher variance in payoffs. We provide some necessary and some sufficient conditions for learning rules, that assume the agent has little prior and feedback information about the environment, to reflect such...

We study how learning shapes behavior towards risk when individuals are not assumed to know, or to have beliefs about, probability distributions. In any period, the behavior change induced by learning is assumed to depend on the action chosen and the payoff obtained. We characterize learning...

We provide a general framework to study stochastic sequences related to individual learning in economics, learning automata in computer sciences, social learning in marketing, and other applications. More precisely, we study the asymptotic properties of a class of stochastic sequences that take...

I provide a full characterization of the set of absolutely expedient learning rules introduced in Börgers et al. [2]. The expected change in the expected payoff can be written as a quadratic form on the vector of relative expected payoffs of the strategies. This permits use of standard linear...

We study strategic communication in a sender-receiver gamein which the sender sends a message about the observed quality ofthe good to the receiver who may accept or reject the good without knowing the true quality or the sender's type. The game has infinitely many perfect Bayesian Nash...

We study persuasion in a modified Crawford–Sobel sender–receiver game in which the receiver makes a binary decision to accept or reject a good recommended by the sender. The good's quality and the sender's type (neutral or biased) are not observable to the receiver. These alterations yield a...