The use of screening contracts is a common approach to solve supply chain coordination problems under asymmetric information. One major assumption in this context is that subjects will rather use their private information strategically than to reveal them truthfully, if they do not get any...

Based on a serial supply chain model with 2-periods and price-sensitive demand, we present the first experimental test of the effect of strategic inventories on supply chain performance. In theory, if holding costs are low enough, the buyer builds up a strategic inventory (even if no operational...

Screening contracts are a common approach to solve supply chain coordination problems under asymmetric information. Previous research in this area shows that asymmetric information leads to supply chain coordination deficits. We extend the standard framework of lotsizing decisions under...

Supply chains facing asymmetric information can either operate in a cooperative mode with information and benefit sharing or can choose a non-cooperative form of interaction and align their incentives via screening contracts. In the cooperative mode, supply chain efficiency can be achieved, but...

We consider a principal agent problem in a decentralized organization. The agent holds private information with respect to an uncertain demand within a single selling season. As such his task is to determine the optimal order quantity. Being head of a profit center, however, he naturally focuses...

We test the lower bound for a static remanufacturing system with returns proposed by Feng and Viswanathan (2014) against two heuristics proposed by Choi et al. (2007) and Schulz and Voigt (2014). A numerical study with 81,000 instances concludes that the lower bound always holds for the Choi...

Screening contracts (or ‘menu of contracts’) are frequently used for aligning the incentives in supply chains with private information. In this context, it is assumed that all supply chain parties are strictly (expected) profit-maximizing. However, previous empirical work shows that this is...

An effective planning of lot sizes is a key strategy to efficiently manage a combined manufacturing/remanufacturing system in the presence of substantial setup costs. Due to its complex interdependencies, optimal policies and solutions have not been identified so far, but several heuristic...

The strategic use of private information causes efficiency losses in traditional principal-agent settings. One stream of research states that these efficiency losses cannot be overcome if all agents use their private information strategically. Yet, another stream of research highlights the...

Screening contracts (or non-linear "menu of contracts") are frequently used for aligning the incentives in supply chains with private information. In this context, it is assumed that all supply chain parties are strictly (expected) profit maximizing and, therefore, sensible to even arbitrarily...