In most electricity markets generators must submit step-function offers to a uniform price auction. These markets are often modelled as simpler pure-strategy Supply Function Equilibria (SFE) with continuous supply functions. Critics argue that the discreteness and discontinuity of the required...

In most wholesale electricity markets generators must submit step-function offers of supply to a uniform price auction, and the market is cleared at the price of the most expensive offer needed to meet realised demand. Such markets can most elegantly be modelled as the pure-strategy, Nash...

The supply function equilibrium provides a game-theoretic model of strategic bidding in oligopolistic wholesale electricity auctions. This paper presents an intuitive account of current understanding and shows how welfare losses depend on the number of firms in the market and their asymmetry....

The supply function equilibrium provides a game-theoretic model of strategic bidding in oligopolistic wholesale electricity auctions. This paper presents an intuitive account of current understanding and shows how welfare losses depend on the number of firms in the market and their asymmetry....

The stochastic uncapacitated single allocation p-hub center problem is an extension of the deterministic version which aims to minimize the longest origin-destination path in a hub and spoke network. Considering the stochastic nature of travel times on links is important when designing a network...

Producers submit offer curves to a procurement auction, e.g. an electricity auction, before uncertain demand has been realised. In the supply function equilibrium (SFE), every firm commits to the offer curve that maximises its expected profit, given the offer curves of competitors. The...

In multi-unit auctions, such as auctions of commodities and securities, and financial exchanges, it is necessary to specify rationing rules to break ties between multiple marginal bids. The standard approach in the literature and in practice is to ration marginal bids proportionally. This paper...

Transport constraints limit competition and arbitrageurs' possibilities of exploiting price differences between commodities in neighbouring markets. We analyze a transportation network where oligopoly producers compete with supply functions under uncertain demand, as in wholesale electricity...

Transport constraints limit competition and arbitrageurs' possibilities of exploiting price differences between goods in neighbouring markets, especially when storage capacity is negligible. We analyse this in markets where strategic producers compete with supply functions, as in wholesale...

In multi-unit auctions, such as auctions of commodities and securities, and financial exchanges, it is necessary to specify rationing rules to break ties between multiple marginal bids. The standard approach in the literature and in pratice is to ration marginal bids proportionally. This paper...