Student volunteers at the U.S. Naval Academy (USNA) participated in one of the following oneshot games: a dictator game, an ultimatum game, a trust game, or a prisoner’s dilemma game. We find limited support for the importance of personality type for explaining subjects’ decisions. With...

Student volunteers at the U.S. Naval Academy (USNA) participated in one of the following one-shot games: a dictator game, an ultimatum game, a trust game, or a prisoner's dilemma game. We find limited support for the importance of personality type for explaining subjects' decisions. With...

This paper uses responder pre-commitment and psychological type, as measured by the Myers- Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI), to gain insight into subject behavior in a laboratory ultimatum bargaining experiment. Three experiment design details are noteworthy: (1) one design requires responders to...

Most studies of the determinants of understanding in economics focus on performance in a single course or standardized exam. Taking advantage of a large data set available at the U.S. Naval Academy (USNA), the authors examined the performance of economics majors over an entire curriculum. They...

Most studies of the determinants of understanding in economics focus on performance in a single course or standardized exam. Taking advantage of a large data set available at the U.S. Naval Academy (USNA), the authors examined the performance of economics majors over an entire curriculum. They...

We examine laboratory bargaining experiments with symmetric and asymmetric delay costs and options for proposers to credibly commit to a bargaining position. Contrary to standard game-theoretic predictions, our experimental results suggest that commitment can be used effectively to increase the...

The majority of theoretical and experimental research stemming from Tullock’s (1980) model of rent-seeking considers static, single-period contests. This paper contributes to a growing body of research on multi-period rent-seeking contests by developing and experimentally testing a model in...

Using a simple, double-blind dictator experiment, we examine the extent to which subjects' choices of distributive shares are influenced by unearned social position. We measure social position by the initial distributive shares (resources) and the subjects' ability to determine the final...

In a simple double-blind dictator experiment, systematically removing subjects’ levels of power and entitlement increases their choice of an income distribution generally consistent with Rawls (1971) concept of distributive justice, although choices are less unanimous and risk-averse than...

This paper develops and experimentally tests a model in which a player’s effort affects the probability of winning a contest in both the current and future periods. Theory predicts that rent-seeking effort will be shifted forward from later to earlier periods, with no change in overall...