Bulow and Levin’s (<CitationRef CitationID="CR3">2006</CitationRef>) “Matching and Price Competition” studies a matching model in which hospitals compete for interns by offering wages. We relax the assumption of symmetric linear costs and compare the pricing equilibrium that results to the firm-optimal competitive equilibrium. With...</citationref>

In this paper, we characterise the compromise value of a game as the barycentre of the edges of its core cover. For this, we introduce the τ* value, which extends the adjusted proportional rule for bankruptcy situations and coincides with the compromise value on a large class of games....

In this paper, we characterise the compromise value of a game as the barycentre of the edges of its core cover. For this, we introduce the τ* value, which extends the adjusted proportional rule for bankruptcy situations and coincides with the compromise value on a large class of games....

This paper studies equilibrium behavior in a class of games that models asymmetric multiprize competitions in which players' costs need not be strictly increasing in their performance. Such costs accommodate various types of asymmetries, including head starts. Head starts capture incumbency...

The paper studies a new class of games, "All-Pay Contests", which capture general asymmetries and sunk investments inherent in scenarios such as lobbying, competition for market power, labor-market tournaments, and R&D races. Players have continuous, non-decreasing cost functions and compete for...

I consider competitions in which, conditional on winning or losing, the effort exerted by a competitor does not necessarily decrease his payoff. This happens, for example, in competitions for promotions in which workers are intrinsically motivated, and in research and development races in which...

I show that a unique equilibrium exists in an asymmetric two-player all-pay auction with a discrete signal structure, correlated signals, and interdependent valuations. The proof is constructive, and the construction can be implemented as a computer program and be used to derive comparative...

This paper considers participation in deterministic contests for m≥1 identical prizes, which employ an auction-like rule to determine the winners. In most papers that investigate such models, participation by precisely m+1 players is associated with players having complete information about...

This paper studies equilibrium behavior in a class of games that models asymmetric competitions with unconditional and conditional investments. Such competitions include lobbying settings, labor-market tournaments, and R& races, among others. I provide an algorithm that constructs the unique...