We study the harmonization of the base pay for the Members of the European Parliament (MEPs). Prior to this reform, implemented in 2009, base pay was aligned with that of national parliamentarians, causing large differences in pay between the MEPs representing 27 member states. Based on detailed...

We study the harmonization of the base remuneration for the Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) who were previously paid like national parliamentarians implying large differences between the delegations from the 27 member countries. Based on detailed information on individual MEPs between...

<span style="font-size:12.0pt; line-height:115%; font-family:"Times New Roman","serif"">Traditional political economy has paid primary attention to the structuring of the principal-agent relationship between citizens and politicians and the role of competition and institutions in disciplining political agents. However, as the electoral control of politicians and the credibility of...</span>

AbstractSenior officials in the ministerial bureaucracy are responsible for the coordination of public service activity  and their number has grown enormously since World War II. We study the growth in employment  of this politically  sensitive high-profile occupational group from a political...

This paper addresses the personal linkages between the public administration and the legislature that emerge because public servants pursue a political mandate. There are concerns that the strong representation of bureaucrats in many Western parliaments compromises the constitutionally proposed...

This paper addresses the personal linkages between the public administration and the legislaturethat emerge because public servants pursue a political mandate. There are concernsthat the strong representation of bureaucrats in many Western parliaments compromises theconstitutionally proposed...

Countries differ substantially in how they deal with politicians  that come from the public sector. Most constitutions include  incompatibility and  ineligibility rules  due  to  concerns about conflicts  of interest  and the politicization of the public  service.   We study  how...

In this paper, we propose a framework to integrate the identity of legislators in a politico-economic analysis of parliamentary oversight. Legislators decide about the effort they invest in oversight activities depending on their individual control costs and the level of electoral competition....