Showing 1 - 10 of 14
In this paper we develop a spatial Cournot trade model with two unequally sized countries, using the geographical interpretation of the Hotelling line. We analyse the trade and welfare effects of international trade between these two countries. The welfare analysis indicates that in this...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010761330
This paper analyzes the incentive for a cartel agreement between hospitals. For this purpose we extend a quality competition model developed by Montefiori (2005). We investigate that collusion on a low provided quality level will lead to higher profits for both hospitals. Therefore both...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010840468
This paper develops a spatial model to analyze the stability of a market sharing agreement between two firms. We find that the stability of the cartel depends on the relative market size of each firm. Collusion is not attractive for firms with a small home market, but the incentive for collusion...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010856771
In this note we analyze the incentives to merge in a mixed duopoly if firms compete in prices or quantities. Our model framework mainly follows Barcena-Ruiz and Garzon (J Econ 80:27–42, <CitationRef CitationID="CR1">2003</CitationRef>) who set up the model with quantity competition. We extend their analysis by analyzing the case of...</citationref>
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010987664
This paper develops the incentives to collude in a model with spatially separated markets and quantity setting firms. We find that increases in transportation costs stabilize the collusive agreement. We also show that, the higher the demand in both markets the less likely will collusion be...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010988950
This paper develops the incentives to collude in a model with spatially separated markets and quantity setting firms. We find that increases in transportation costs stabilize the collusive agreement. We also show that, the higher the demand in both markets the less likely will collusion be...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009368118
Fusionen stellen einen zentralen Baustein der Industrieökonomik dar. In diesem Buch wird der Frage nachgegangen, welchen Einfluss die räumliche Dimension auf eine Fusion ausübt. Dabei wird ein Grundmodell entwickelt und über dieses hinaus eine Vielzahl Erweiterungen präsentiert. Der Leser...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010752368
After an unsatisfactory purchase, many firms are quick to apologize to customers. It is, however, not clear why they should do that. As the apology is costless, it should be regarded as cheap talk and thus ignored by the customer. In this paper, we test in a controlled field experiment whether...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005011861
How should firms react to customer complaints after an unsatisfactory purchase? In a field experiment, we test the effect of different reactions and find that a cheap-talk apology yields significantly better outcomes for the firm than offering a monetary compensation.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008551391
This paper considers a spatial discrimination Cournot model with asymmetric demand. We use the geographical interpretation of the linear market and introduce differentiated products. We analyze a location-quantity game and show that agglomeration or dispersed locations may arise, depending on...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009643086