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We provide explicit formulas for the nucleolus of an arbitrary assignment game with two buyers and two sellers. Five different cases are analyzed depending on the entries of the assignment matrix. We extend the results to the case of 2 x m or m x 2 assignment games.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010672354
We provide explicit formulas for the nucleolus of an arbitrary assignment game with two buyers and two sellers. Five different cases are analyzed depending on the entries of the assignment matrix. We extend the results to the case of 2 m or m 2 assignment games.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010817236
In this paper we characterize convex games by means of Owen's multilinear extension and the marginal worth vectors associated with even or odd permutations. Therefore we have obtained a refinement of the classic theorem; Shapley (1971), Ichiishi (1981) in order to characterize the convexity of a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005755776
We prove a theorem on the intersection of the Weber sets (Weber, 1988) of two ordered cooperative games. From this theorem several consequences are derived, the inclusion of the core in the Weber set (Weber, 1988), the fact that every convex game has a large core (Sharkey, 1982), and a discrete...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005375634
In the framework of bilateral assignment games, we study the set of matrices associated with assignment markets with the same core. We state conditions on matrix entries that ensure that the related assignment games have the same core. We prove that the set of matrices leading to the same core...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049744
A matrix A defines an assignment market, where each row represents a buyer and each column a seller. If buyer i is matched with seller j, the market produces aij units of utility. Quint (1991) points out that usually many different assignment matrices exist that define markets with the same core...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009018719
We study the marginal worth vectors and their convex hull, the so-called Weber set, from the original coalitional game and the transformed one, which is called the Weber set of level k. We prove that the core of the original game is included in each of the Weber set of level k,for any k,and that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010737503
We study the marginal worth vectors and their convex hull, the socalled Weber set, from the original coalitional game and the transformed one, which is called the Weber set of level k. We prove that the core of the original game is included in each of the Weber set of level k, for any k, and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010746932
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005371498
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005375554