Concessions try to avoid conflict in bargaining and can finally lead to an agreement. Although they usually are seen as unfolding in time, concessions can also be studied in normal form or by conditioning only on failure of earlier agreement attempts. We experimentally compare three protocols of...

In the context of an allocation game, this paper analyses the proposer's reported beliefs about the responder's willingness to accept (or reject) the proposed split of the pie. The proposer's beliefs are elicited via a quadratic scoring rule. An econometric model of the proposer's beliefs is...

We offer an evolutionary model of the emergence of concepts of salience through similarity-based learning. When an individual faces a new decision problem, she chooses an action that she perceives as similar to actions that, when chosen in similar previous problems, led to favourable outcomes....

We offer an evolutionary model of the emergence of concepts of salience through similarity-based learning. When an individual faces a new decision problem, she chooses an action that she perceives as similar to actions that, when chosen in similar previous problems, led to favourable outcomes....

Like avoiding labor protection laws via foreign subcontractors, banning deception in economic experiments does not exclude experiments with participants in the role of experimenters who, similar to properly incentivized subcontractors, can gain by deceiving those in the role of proper...

Banning deception in economic experiments does not exclude experiments with participants in the role of experimenters who can gain by deceiving those in the role of participants. We compare treatments with and without possible deception by experimenter-participants to test whether deception...

There is robust field data showing that a frequent and successful way of looking for a job is via the intermediation of friends and relatives. Here we want to test this experimentally. Participants first play a simple public goods game with two interaction partners ('friends'), and share...

We consider a sequential two-party bargaining game with uncertain information transmission. When the first mover states her demand she does only know the probability with which the second mover will be informed about it. The informed second mover can either accept or reject the offer and payoffs...

In three-party ultimatum games, the proposer can first decide whether to exclude one responder, which increases the available pie. The experiments control for intentionality of exclusion and veto power of the third party. We do not find evidence for indirect reciprocity of the remaining...

We study first- and second-price private value auctions with sequential bidding where second movers may discover the first movers bids. There is a unique equilibrium in the first-price auction and multiple equilibria in the second-price auction. Consequently, comparative statics across price...