We study experiments in an auction setting with interdependent valuation. Groups of three players receive private signals and then bid for a single, indivisible item. Valuations for the item differ within groups and depend asymmetrically on a bidder's own and other bidders' signals....

This study disentangles experimentally imitation, reinforcement, and reciprocity in repeated prisoners' dilemmas. We compare a simple situation in which players interact only with their neighbours (local interaction) with one where players interact with all members of the population (group...

We study a model of local evolution. Players are located on a network and play games agains their neighbors. Players are characterized by three properties: (1) The stage game strategies they use agains their neighbors. (2) The repeated game strategy that determines the former. (3) A learning...

This paper applies the idea of evolution to a spatial model. We assume that prisoners' dilemmas or coordination games are played repeatedly within neighborhoods where players do not optimize but instead copy successful strategies. Discriminatory behavior of players is introduced representing...

We present a simple model of spatial evolution that avoids several problems that arise with more complex networks of players. We consider a world where pairs of players are permanently matched. These players learn from the whole population but they are more likely to learn to strategies used by...

We present results from a series of experiments that allow us to measure overbidding and, in particular, underbidding in first-price auctions. We investigate how the amount of underbidding depends on seemingly innocent parameters of the experimental setup. To structure our data we present and...

Bubbles are omnipresent in lab experiments with asset markets. But these experiments were (mostly) conducted in environments with only human traders. Today markets are substantially determined by algorithmic traders. Here we use a laboratory experiment to measure human trading behaviour changes...

Although many real bargaining situations involve more than one person on each side of the bargaining table, much of the theoretical and experimental research concentrates on two single players. We study a simple extension: bilateral bargaining of four people (two two-person groups) with...