Most tradable permit regimes have ignored the role of emission allowance taxation whereas the OECD and the European Union have emphasized the need for further investigation of the related efficiency and effectiveness consequences. The aim of our paper is to take a first step in this direction....

We investigate the efficiency and effectiveness consequences of emissions trading taxation. A theoretical partial equilibrium model is developed, showing that permits taxation distorts the equilibrium price and abatement efforts. Potentially counterintuitive conclusions concerning the tax...

This paper addresses the issue of whether the powers of monitoring compliance and allocating tradeable emissions allowances within a federation of countries should be appointed to a unique federal regulator or decentralized to several local regulators. To this end, we develop a two stage game...

It is well known that many standard results on optimal taxation and tax reforms have a straightforward counterpart in the monopoly pricing context and the Ramsey-Boiteux pricing rule represents the most obvious and well known example of this connection. What is less acknowledged, maybe even by...

This paper provides a unified vision of a number of results that appeared in three separate streams of literature. The author emphasizes the strong parallelism between the results obtained in a number of papers that analyzed the relationships between price cap regulation, welfare maximization,...

This paper provides a unified vision of a number of results that appeared in three separate streams of literature. The author emphasizes the strong parallelism between the results obtained in a number of papers that analyzed the relationships between price cap regulation, welfare maximization,...

This paper analyzes the allocative properties of price cap regulation under very general hypotheses on the nature of society's preferences. We propose a generalized price cap that ensures the convergence to optimal (second best) prices in the long-run equilibrium for virtually any form of the...

Price capped firms enjoy a large degree of pricing discretion, which may harm customers and competition. We study two alternative regulatory regimes to limit it: the first regime (Absolute) places a fixed upper limit to the prices charged in captive markets, while the other regime (Relative)...

Price capped firms enjoy a large degree of pricing discretion, which may damage captive customers and have adverse effects on the development of competition when regulated firms also operate in competitive industries. We study two alternative regulatory approaches to limit such a discretion. The...