We consider a model in which there is uncertainty over when a one-shot game will be played. We show how a mechanism designer can implement desirable outcomes in certain economic games by manipulating only the probability that the game is played in a given round while leaving all other aspects of...

A stationary variant of the repeated prisoners’ dilemma in which the game frontier is a parallelogram is analyzed. By using the probabilistic cheap talk concept of [3], the discount factor becomes fungible, and for a critical value of the discount factor a unique Pareto-optimal and...

We explore the relationship between capital accumulation, trade, and the development of property rights. In our analysis, the development of property rights is an endogenous process, driven by capital accumulation. Property rights are defined as institutions that internalize the portion of the...

We then characterize analytically and numerically how the characteristics of private information—its quantity, persistence and correlation, and division among speculators—affect trading profits, pricing and trading strategies. In particular, we derive how speculators trade on new information...

A firm monopsonistically hires labor from a pool containing both skilled and unskilled workers. The marginal value of a worker depends on the match between the job and the worker?s skill level. Unskilled workers can have negative productivity if they are placed in a skilled job. The firm cannot...

type="main" <p>We characterize a duopoly buffeted by demand and cost shocks. Firms learn about shocks from common observation, private observation, and noisy price signals. Firms internalize how outputs affect a rival's signal, and hence output. We distinguish how the nature of information...</p>

We revisit Kyle’s (Econometrica 53:1315–1335, <CitationRef CitationID="CR11">1985</CitationRef>) model of price formation in the presence of private information. We begin by using Back’s (Rev Financ Stud 5(3):387–409, <CitationRef CitationID="CR1">1992</CitationRef>) approach, demonstrating that if standard assumptions are imposed, the model has a unique equilibrium solution...</citationref></citationref>

"We model the development of property rights as an endogenous process, driven by capital accumulation. Property rights internalize the portion of the return to capital that is otherwise treated as common property. This enclosure further encourages capital accumulation and sustains economic...

Consider a collection of agents with stochastically fluctuating heterogeneous endowments. It seems natural that credit is the appropriate market mechanism for insuring such fluctuations: individuals save when endowment is high, and deplete their savings or borrow when their endowment is low. The...

A principal has a stochastically evolving target that he wishes an agent to repeatedly hit with his effort. The agent does not obtain utility from hitting the target and therefore attempts to shirk; the agent's utility is determined by a second process that symmetrically is of no use to the...