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Mixed motives: an empirical analysis of ILO roll-call votes

Boockmann, Bernhard - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW) - 2002

Organization (ILO). We distinguish between the instrumental motive for voting, which consists in the chance that one´s vote may …In this empirical paper, we look at individual voting behaviour of government delegates to the International Labour … multinomial logit with country-specific unobserved heteroge-neity, using roll-call votes on the final passage of ILO conventions …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005097496

The ratification of ILO conventions: a failure time analysis

Boockmann, Bernhard - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW) - 2000

There are over 180 ILO conventions in many areas of labour law, industrial relations and social security, but they are … industrialised countries, the ratification of ILO conventions is shown to depend on internal political factors such as the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005097543

"A Dynamic General Equilibrium Analysis of the Political Economy of Public Education."

Soares, Jorge - Department of Economics, Lerner College of Business and … - 2005

The primary objective of this paper is to highlight the distinct roles of altruism and of self-interest in the political determination of a public education policy. I assess the relative importance of three factors in the determination of the equilibrium level of this policy: altruism, the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005487490

Political Support for Targeted versus Universalistic Welfare Policies

Moene, K.O.; Wallerstein, M. - Økonomisk institutt, Universitetet i Oslo - 1997

a redistributive effect). With self-interested voting, low benefits may so reduce the probability of receiving benefits …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005424059

A Note on Nonwhite Migration, Welfare Levels, and the Political Process

Cebula, Richard - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 1975

political (voting) process they effectively exert pressures to raise welfare levels per recipient on the other hand. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011110525

Lobbying of Firms by Voters

Dahm, Matthias; Dur, Robert; Glazer, Amihai - Tinbergen Instituut - 2009

A firm may induce voters or elected politicians to support a policy it favors by suggesting that it is more likely to invest in a district whose voters or representatives support the policy. In equilibrium, no one vote may be decisive, and the policy may gain strong support though the majority...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011257421

The Buchanan-Tullock Model: Some Extensions

Kafoglis, Milton; Cebula, Richard - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 1980

In their seminal work, The Calculus of Consent (1962), Buchanan and Tullock develop a decision model which embodies fundamental relationships relevant to institutional choices. However, the Buchanan-Tullock model remains "general," thus inviting others to specify details and to develop...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011257880

In Search of Optimum "Relative Unanimity"

Cebula, Richard; Kafoglis, Milton - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 1982

This paper formulates a simple mathematical framework for the selection of an optimum "relative unanimity” collective decision rule. The approach is first to identify the benefits of moving from a rule of simple majority towards a rule of full unanimity. Then, the costs of moving from simple...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011260983

The Paradox of Grading Systems

Brams, Steven; Potthoff, Richard - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2015

We distinguish between (i) voting systems in which voters can rank candidates and (ii) those in which they can grade … candidates, such as approval voting, in which voters can give two grades—approve (1) or not approve (0)—to candidates. While two …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011212580

Behavioral Political Economy: A Survey

Schnellenbach, Jan; Schubert, Christian - CESifo - 2014

Explaining individual behavior in politics should rely on the same motivational assumptions as explaining behavior in the market: That’s what Political Economy, understood as the application of economics to the study of political processes, is all about. In its standard variant, those who...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010948848