According to Chang et al. (2013), social welfare under licensing is lower than under no-licensing if the R&D efficiency is high. We show that this result is not correct, as when R&D efficiency is high social welfare is higher under licensing than under no-licensing.

This article analyses the pricing policy equilibria emerging in a duopoly when one firm may choose whether to engage in behaviour-based price discrimination or uniform pricing while the rival price discriminates. The question we address is: should a firm price discriminate when facing a price...

The circular city model and the linear city model are extended to allow for asymmetric directional transportation costs. A two-stage location-then-quantity model is proposed. We show that in the circular city model, maximal dispersion arises in equilibrium, while in the linear city model, the...

This article investigates the optimal licensing mechanism in a spatial model where competitors set quantities and one firm owns a cost-reducing innovation. We show that when the firms spatially discriminate, the innovator gets higher profits by licensing through royalties instead than through a...

Adopting a general spatial framework, we analyse collusion concerning a price increase between two firms. We find that any variable affects the sustainability of collusion in the same way it affects the competitive profits. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2012

<title>Abstract</title> In a spatial economic context, we analyse the incentive to prey of an incumbent facing the potential entrance by a rival. We show that the existence of space modifies the incentive to prey of the incumbent and the resulting equilibrium.

This paper proposes a formal model that analyzes the degree of openness chosen by start-ups when entering the software industry. In line with the literature, we label as degree of openness the extent to which software start-ups mix open source (OS) and proprietary solutions in the portfolio of...

Using a general spatial model with two firms interacting repeatedly, we show that the condition for collusion sustainability is the same under uniform delivered pricing, discriminatory delivered pricing and discriminatory f.o.b. pricing.

This paper reviews the main contributions of the literature regarding the effects of direct price discrimination within the Hotelling model. Moreover, we introduce an asymmetric Hotelling model and we show that the assumption of spatial asymmetry between firms is likely to alter the implications...