This paper studies the impact of learning by doing on shakeouts in monopolistic competition. Firms have different initial costs and set prices to maximize current profits in each period. Although all firms make positive profits at the beginning and grow for a certain period of time, shakeouts...

This paper explores economically meaningful forms of cost functions for process research and development in the presence of imperfect appropriability of inventive output. We propose, as a central criterion to be satisfied by the knowledge production process, that a given R&D investment should...

Should two–band income taxes be progressive given a general income distribution? We provide a negative answer under utilitarian and max-min welfare functions. While this result clarifies some ambiguities in the literature, it does not rule out progressive taxes in general. If we maximize total...

This paper compares Cournot and Bertrand equilibria with mixed products, linear demand and cost functions. It is found that a firm's price (output) need not be higher (lower) in Cournot equilibrium. However, given any number of firms and a mixture of complement and substitute products, every...

This paper considers three linear asymmetric oligopoly models with (i) a representative consumer, (ii) horizontal differentiation and (iii) vertical differentiation. We show that firms could maximize the joint-profit only based on private and aggregate information. They can choose the...

This paper studies the incentives and the welfare effect of sharing firm-specific information in asymmetric Cournot and Bertrand oligopoly with mixed substitute and complement goods. Revealing firm-specific cost information is the dominant strategy in Cournot oligopoly, while concealing is so in...

Using a simple method we show that, in contrast to the case of Bertrand and Cournot competition, better public information about demand reduces the profits of firms playing a R&D cost reduction game. Welfare increases with the precision of public information in the Cournot and cost reduction...

Strategic cost reduction requires cost transparency. When unilateral cost revelation is feasible, strategic cost reduction indeed arises as equilibrium. If it is not feasible, however, credible revelation has to be organized, possibly by a trade association. Then, firms face a prisoners'...

The paper examines firms' choices between innovation and imitation in duopoly. We show that in the unique equilibrium asymmetric firms choose the same level of expenditure on imitation and the same ratio of innovative cost reduction to output. We evaluate the marginal contribution of innovation...