We study multivariate prevention decisions by disentangling early and late prevention. We show how the modularity of prevention and several measures of prevention efficiency interact with the agent’s risk attitude. We derive comparative statics with respect to impatience, loss severity, and...

This paper studies long-term private health insurance (PHI) in Germany. It describes the main actuarial principles of premium calculation and relates these to existing theory. In the German PHI policyholders do not commit to renewing their insurance contracts, but insurers commit to offering...

Unternehmen stehen heute aufgrund ökonomischer Anreize verstärkt vor der Entscheidung, die bisher intern gelagerte Datenverarbeitung und Geschäftsprozesse auf einen externen Anbieter von Cloud-Computing-Services auszulagern. Diese neuartige Form des IT-Outsourcings verändert jedoch die...

Unternehmen stehen heute aufgrund ökonomischer Anreize verstärkt vor der Entscheidung, die bisher intern gelagerte Datenverarbeitung und Geschäftsprozesse auf einen externen Anbieter von Cloud-Computing-Dienstleistungen auszulagern. Diese neuartige Form des IT-Outsourcing verändert jedoch...

This paper studies the effect of increased risk aversion on self-insurance and self-protection in a two-period framework. Here risk management incentives and consumption smoothing incentives are traded off, and the monotonic relationship between self-insurance and risk aversion may no longer...

When risks are interdependent, an agent's decision to self-protect affects the loss probabilities faced by others. Due to these externalities, economic agents invest too little in prevention relative to the socially efficient level by ignoring marginal external costs or benefits conferred on...

When risks are interdependent, an agent’s decision to self-protect affects the loss probabilities faced by others. Due to these externalities, economic agents invest too little in prevention relative to the socially efficient level by ignoring marginal external costs or benefits conferred on...

The paper analyzes a monopolistic insurer’s pricing strategies when potential customers differ in risk aversion and their type cannot be observed by the insurer. Our model builds on Schlesinger (1983), who derived optimal nonlinear pricing strategies for competitive and monopolistic insurance...

We examine the impact of intermediation on insurance market transparency and performance. In a differentiated insurance market under imperfect information, consumers can gain information about product suitability by consulting an intermediary. We analyze current broker compensation methods:...