Technical efficiency in the Danish trawl fishery in the North Sea is estimated for 1997 and 1998 by a stochastic production frontier model. This model allows noise when the frontier and the technical efficiency is found, which for fisheries is a reasonable assumption. The results show that the...

The EU regulation of fisheries is decided in two levels. The level of the total allowable catch (TAC) for the most important species is decided every year by the Council of Minsters. The TACs are allocated to the Member States as quotas. The Member States determine who is going to harvest the...

This paper discusses the conditions for generalizing the analysis in Weitzman (1974) to fisheries. It is shown that it is straightforward to generalize the analysis if the cost function is direct additively separable in stock size and catches. This leads to the conclusion that the analysis holds...

The paper shows that explicit modelling of sunk cost and a firm’s entry-exit decision in a traditional deterministic investment model may give an explanation of the slow transition to the optimal fleet structure following the introduction of individual transferable quotas (ITQs). The analysis...

Real life implies that public procurement contracting of renewable resources results in repeated interaction between a principal and the agents. The present paper analyses ratchet effects in contracting of renewable resources and how the presence of a resource constraint alters the...

This paper treats illegal landings as a moral hazard problem that arises, since individual catches are unobservable to society and hence private information. A tax/subsidy mechanism taking into account the asymmetric information problem is formulated as a solution to problems with illegal...

Within fisheries it is well-known that several market failures exist. However, fisheries economists analyse these market failures separately despite the fact that the market failures arise simultaneously. In this paper several market fail-ures that arise simultaneously are analysed. A resource...

To solve the problem of illegal landings this article proposes a new tax mechanism based on the regulator's own aggregate catch estimates and "ex ante" self-reports of planned catch by fishermen. We show that the mechanism avoids illegal landings while ensuring (nearly) optimal exploitation and...