Consider a population of farmers who live around a lake. Each farmer engages in trade with his two adjacent neighbors. The trade is governed by a prisoner’s dilemma “rule of engagement.” A farmer’s payoff is the sum of the payoffs from the two prisoner’s dilemma games played with his...

Replaced with revised version of paper 02/27/08.

It stands to reason that social unrest does not erupt out of the blue. Although there are a great many reasons why social dismay might descend into social disorder, only few yardsticks or indices can plausibly be used to gauge the potential for social unrest (PSU). If policy makers want to...

It stands to reason that social unrest does not erupt out of the blue. Although there are a great many reasons why social dismay might descend into social disorder, only few yardsticks or indices can plausibly be used to gauge the potential for social unrest (PSU). If policy makers want to...

Consider a population of farmers who live around a lake. Each farmer engages in trade with his m adjacent neighbors, where m is termed the "span of interaction." Trade is governed by a prisoner’s dilemma "rule of engagement." A farmer’s payoff is the sum of the payoffs from the m...

We present the algorithm OPTGAME 2.0 to solve N-person discrete-time LQ games exactly, and discrete-time non-linear quadratic games approximately by means of an appropriate linearization procedure, where N2. I.e., the objective function is assumed to be quadratic in the deviations of states and...

Drug use and related problems change substantially over time, so it seems plausible that drug interventions should vary too. To investigate this possibility, we set up a continuous time version of the first-order difference equation model of cocaine use introduced by Everingham and Rydell...