We analyse the scheduling decisions of competing transport operators, using a horizontal differentiation model with price-sensitive demand and asymmetric distance costs. Two competitors choose fares and departure times in a fixed time interval; consumers' locations indicate their desired...

See also the publication in the <A HREF="http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/lse/jtep/2014/00000048/00000002/art00005">'Journal of Transport Economics and Policy'</A>, 2014, 48(2), 261-277.<P> We formulate a horizontal differentiation model with price-sensitive demand and asymmetric transport costs, in the context of transport scheduling. Two competitors choose fares and departure times...</p></a>

This discussion paper resulted in a publication in <A HREF="http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S019126151300043X">'Transportation Research Part B: Methodological'</A>, 2013, 53, 31-44. We analyse the behaviour of market participants in a multi-modal commuter network where roads are not priced, but public transport has a usage fee, which is set while taking the...</a>

We analyze the behavior of market participants in a multi-modal commuter network, where roads are not priced, but public transport has a usage fee, which is set while taking the effects on the roads into account. In particular, we analyze the difference between markets with a monopolistic public...

We study interaction between the trips of two types of drivers on a two-lane road who differ by their desired speeds. The difference in desired speeds causes congestion, because slow drivers force fast drivers to reduce their speed. An interesting aspect of this type of congestion is that...

We explore the properties of various types of public and private pricing on a

Using game theory we investigate a new approach to formulate and solve optimal tolls with a focus on different policy objectives of the road authority. The aim is to gain more insight into determining optimal tolls as well as into the behavior of users after tolls have been imposed on the...