We investigate the incentives for facility-based firms to invest in infrastructure upgrades and to foreclose service-based firms. We focus on asymmetric regulation regarding service-based firms' access to the infrastructure held by a facility-based firm. Spillovers from the infrastructure...

We examine a game of competition with access provision in which service quality is endogenously determined through infrastructure upgrades with spillovers. There are two types of equilibria in the free competition regime. In particular, voluntary access provision with an access charge higher...

Although it has for years had a lower unemployment rate than other industrialized countries, Japan has begun to see an increase in unemployment since its economy was hit by the recession of the late 90?s. The level of a nation?s unemployment is commonly seen as a barometer of its economy?s...

This article examines the welfare implications of an incumbent's pre-commitment to an exclusive contract in a partially regulated environment. It shows that the contract offered to customers in a competitive market makes the first-best allocation infeasible in the partially regulated...

<Para ID="Par1">We explain how underinvestment in infrastructure upgrades is aggravated under access regulation with a cost-based access charge. When a cost-based access charge is imposed on an incumbent, the incumbent has a weak incentive to invest in infrastructure upgrades due to insufficient rewards for the...</para>

In our model, an entrant has two effective strategies for profit maximization: collaboration with incumbents and location choice. We analyze the effect of allowing an entrant the opportunity to collaborate with incumbents on its location choice. First, we show that when collaboration requires...

We reexamine the properties of access regulation and an incumbent’s incentive for infrastructure investment under regulatory non-commitment and spillovers through access. The results show that when the degree of spillover is small, the incumbent’s strategic opportunity to invest in...

We examine an incentive transfer scheme in an executive agency system when there are both marketable and nonmarketable public services. We show that because of the incentive transfer scheme, which contributes to the elimination of a government's budget deficit, social welfare is higher in the...

This paper examines firms' incentive to make irreversible investments under an open access policy with stochastically growing demand. Using a simple model, we derive an access-to-bypass equilibrium. Analysis of the equilibrium confirms that the introduction of competition in network industries...