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Games with multiple Nash equilibria are believed to be easier to play if players can communicate. We present a simple model of communication in games and investigate the importance of when communication takes place. Sending a message before play captures talk about intentions, after play...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011140987
×2 games. One-way communication weakly increases coordination on Nash equilibrium outcomes, although average payoffs sometimes … of symmetric 2×2 games, we find that communication facilitates coordination in common interest games with positive … spillovers and strategic complementarities, but there are also games in which any type of communication hampers coordination. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005771174
multi-player coordination game with conflicting preferences. Network structure matters but the interaction between network … coordination and distribution of coordinated outcomes across networks. But increasing the communication length improves both … efficiency an equity of coordination. In all treatments, coordination is mostly explained by convergence in communication. We …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008587475
messages, on their credibility and on actual play. We run an experiment in a three-player coordination game with Pareto ranked …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010937981
close to a state of nature, with the ideal proximity to the state varying across agents. Before this coordination game is …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005012502
messages, on their credibility and on actual play. We run an experiment in a three-player coordination game with Pareto ranked …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011277296
We show that essentially every communication equilibrium of any finite Bayesian game with two players can be implemented as a strategic form correlated equilibrium of an extended game, in which before choosing actions as in the Bayesian game, the players engage in a possibly infinitely long (but...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009416868
We show that essentially every communication equilibrium of any finite Bayesian game with two players can be implemented as a strategic form correlated equilibrium of an extended game, in which before choosing actions as in the Bayesian game, the players engage in a pos-sibly infinitely long...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008853866
We show that essentially every communication equilibrium of any finite Bayesian game with two players can be implemented as a strategic form correlated equilibrium of an extended game, in which before choosing actions as in the Bayesian game, the players engage in a possibly fin nitely long (but...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010708889
range of prior probability of the High-Type. This equilibrium has a desirable type-coordination property: it fully … coordinates on the ex-post efficient pure Nash equilbrium when the players' types are different. Type-coordination is also …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010818179