Recent advances in incentive theory stress the multi- dimensional nature of agent effort and particularly the case where workers can improve the performance of others through `helping' efforts. This paper provides a simple model of an agent's incentive to help depending on the compensation...

Purpose - The purpose of this study is to present theory and empirical evidence on whether changes in leverage are systematically associated with changes in the CEO's risk incentives over time. Design/methodology/approach - A model is developed to explain the dynamic relationship between...

Recent advances in incentive theory stress the multi-dimensional nature of agent effort and specifically cases where workers affect one anothers' performance through `helping' efforts. This paper models helping efforts as determined by the compensation package and task allocation. The model is...

Traditional tournaments among workers yield suboptimal levels of helping efforts, while collective incentives generate free-riding or lack incentive compatibility. We confront these problems using a tournament between workplaces. Under fairly restrictive conditions, the tournament is first-best...

Dissatisfaction with traditional accounting-based performance measures has spawned a number of alternatives, of which Economic Value Added (EVA) is clearly the most prominent. How can we tell which performance measures best capture managerial contributions to value? There is currently a heated...

Academics have long argued that incentive contracts for executives should be indexed to remove the influence of exogenous market factors. Little evidence has been found that firms engage in such practices, also termed "relative performance evaluation". We argue that firms may not gainmuch by...