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We use information on students' past participation in economic experiments, as stored in our database, to analyze whether behavior in public goods games is affected by experience (i.e., previous participation in social dilemma-type experiments) and history (i.e., participation in experiments of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010755823
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010781502
We use information on students' past participation in economic experiments, as stored in our database, to analyze whether behavior in public goods games is affected by experience (i.e., previous participation in social dilemma-type experiments) and history (i.e., participation in experiments of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010775181
In the last decades, there has been a large volume of research showing that emotions do have relevant effects on decision-making. We contribute to this literature by experimentally investigating the impact of four specific emotional states - joviality, sadness, fear, and anger - on risk...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010884474
In a series of one-shot linear public goods game, we ask subjects to report their contributions, their contribution plans for the next period, and their first-order beliefs about their present and future partner. We estimate subjects' preferences from plans data by a finite mixture approach and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009291507
In the hybrid game, one proposer confronts two responders with veto power: one responder can condition his decisions on his own offer but the other cannot. We vary what the informed responder knows about the offers as well as the uninformed responder's conflict payoff. Neither variation affects...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010779440
We introduce a procedurally fair rule to study a situation where people disagree about the value of three alternatives in the way captured by the voting paradox. The rule allows people to select a final collective ranking by submitting a bid vector with six components (the six possible rankings...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009492965
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011098957
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011098960
Similar to Levati and Neugebauer (2001), a clock is used by which participants can vary their individual contributions for voluntarily providing a public good. As time goes by, participants either in(de)crease their contribution gradually or keep it constant. Groups of two poorly and two richly...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010983833