Games with imperfect information often feature multiple equilibria, which depend on beliefs off the equilibrium path. Standard selection criteria such as <i>passive beliefs, symmetric beliefs or wary beliefs</i> rest on ad hoc restrictions on beliefs. We propose a new selection criterion that imposes...

Games with imperfect information often feature multiple equilibria, which depend on beliefs off the equilibrium path. Standard selection criteria such as passive beliefs, symmetric beliefs or wary beliefs rest on ad hoc restrictions on beliefs. We propose a new selection criterion that imposes...

We study the relation between the electorate's information about candidates' policy platforms during an election, and the subsequent provision of inefficient local public goods (pork) by the winning candidate. More information does not lead to better outcomes. We show that the efficient outcome...

We present a theory and experimental evidence on pricing and portfolio choices under asymmetric reasoning. We show that under asymmetric reasoning, prices do not reflect all (types of) reasoning. Some agents who observe prices that cannot be reconciled with their reasoning switch from perceiving...

Given a set of alternatives with multiple attributes, I characterize the set of preference profiles that are representable by weighted versions of a class of utility functions indexed by a parameter δ  0, where δ ≥ 1 corresponds to the set of Minkowski’s (<CitationRef CitationID="CR34">1886</CitationRef>) metric functions. In...</citationref>

Agents with cognitive limitations may compute the expected value of a risky asset incorrectly. If market prices reflect the probabilities of the payoff-relevant states, agents who compute the probabilities incorrectly encounter a market price that is inconsistent with their calculation. We test...

We exploit a voting reform in France to estimate the causal effect of exit poll information on turnout and bandwagon voting. Before the change in legislation, individuals in some French overseas territories voted after the election result had already been made public via exit poll information...

We experimentally investigate information aggregation through majority voting when some voters are biased. In such situations, majority voting can have a dark side, that is, result in groups making choices inferior to those made by individuals acting alone. In line with theoretical predictions,...