This paper studies a general equilibrium model with an investor controlled firm. Shareholders can vote on the firm’s production plan in an assembly. Prior to that they may trade shares on the stock market. Since stock market trades determine the distribution of votes, trading is strategic....

We show that in long repeated games- or in infinitely repeated games with discount rate close to one- payoffs corresponding to evolutionary stable sets are asymptotically efficient, as intuition suggests. Actions played at the beginning of the game are used as messages that allow players to...

Game theoretic models of voter turnout have recently fallen into disrepute because the crucial ingredient of the model, the probability of being pivotal for an individual voter, is infinitesimal in large elections. Moreover such models are plagued by the problem of multiple equilibria. We show...

Equilibrium paths in an economy of overlapping generations are determinate. Time is either discrete or continuous; in either case, it extend into the infinite future and, possibly, the infinite past. There is one, nonstorable commodity at each date. The economy is stationary; intertemporal...

A component of Nash equilibria is (dynamically) potentially stable if there exists an evolutionary selection dynamics from a broad class for which the component is asymptotically stable. A necessary condition for potential stability is that the component's index agrees with its Euler...

Two basic properties concerning the dynamic behavior of competitive equilibria of exchange economies with complete markets are derived essentially from the fact that the Walras correspondence has no knots.