We propose a methodology that is generalizable to a broad class of repeated games in order to facilitate operability of belief-learning models with repeated-game strategies. The methodology consists of (1) a generalized repeated-game strategy space, (2) a mapping between histories and...

We modify the self-tuning Experience Weighted Attraction (EWA-lite) model of Camerer, Ho, and Chong (2007) and use it as a computer testbed to study the likely performance of a set of twostate automata in four symmetric 2 x 2 games. The model suggested allows for a richer specification of...

One of the fundamental problems in both economics and organization is to understand how individuals coordinate. The widely used minimum-effort coordination game has served as a simplified model to better understand this problem. This paper first presents theoretical results that give conditions...

We use laboratory experiments to test for one of the foundations of the rational voter paradigm - that voters respond to probabilities of being pivotal. We exploit a setup that entails stark theoretical effects of information concerning the preference distribution (as revealed through polls) on...

Online publishers sell opportunities to show ads. Some advertisers pay only if their ad elicits a user response. Publishers estimate response rates for ads in order to estimate expected revenues from showing the ads. Then publishers select ads that maximize estimated expected revenue.

Institutions designed to increase turnout appeal to democratic sentiments but are highly debated as they entail two potentially countervailing effects. While generating more pieces of information, they may decrease the average voter's information quality. We examine two commonly discussed...

One of the fundamental problems in both economics and organization is to understand how individuals coordinate. The widely used minimum-effort coordination game has been used as a simplifed model to better understand this problem. This paper first presents some theoretical results that give...

I study two-player undiscounted repeated games with imperfect private monitoring. When strategies are restricted to those implementable by nite automata, fewer equilibrium outcomes are possible. When only two-state automata are allowed, a simple strategy, "Win-Stay, Lose-Shift," leads to...

Global games and Poisson games have been proposed to address equilibrium indeterminacy in Coordination games. The former assume that agents face idiosyncratic uncertainty about economic fundamentals, whereas the latter model the number of actual players as a Poisson random variable to capture...