We consider <InlineEquation ID="IEq1"> <EquationSource Format="TEX">$$H$$</EquationSource> <EquationSource Format="MATHML"> <math xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink"> <mi>H</mi> </math> </EquationSource> </InlineEquation> expected utility maximizers that have to share a risky aggregate multivariate endowment <InlineEquation ID="IEq2"> <EquationSource Format="TEX">$$X\in {\mathbb {R}}^{N}$$</EquationSource> <EquationSource Format="MATHML"> <math xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink"> <mrow> <mi>X</mi> <mo>∈</mo> <msup> <mrow> <mi mathvariant="double-struck">R</mi> </mrow> <mi>N</mi> </msup> </mrow> </math> </EquationSource> </InlineEquation> and address the following two questions: does efficient risk-sharing imply restrictions on the form of individual consumptions as a...</equationsource></equationsource></inlineequation></equationsource></equationsource></inlineequation>

We consider a problem of derivatives design under asymmetry of information: the principal sells a contingent claim to an agent, the type of whom he does not know. More precisely, the principal designs a contingent claim and prices it for each possible agent type, in such a way that each agent...

We consider H expected utility maximizers that have to share a risky aggregate multivariate endowment X∈RN and address the following two questions: does efficient risk-sharing imply restrictions on the form of individual consumptions as a function of X ? Can one identify the individual utility...

In this article, we study a class of functions defined by a system of linear inequalities which arises naturally in at least four different economic issues: redistribution, spatial economics, theory of incentives and utility theory. The main tool used to study solutions of those inequalities...

We are given a list of tasks Z and a population divided into several groups X j of equal size. Performing one task z requires constituting a team with exactly one member x j from every group. There is a cost (or reward) for participation: if type x j chooses task z, he receives p j (z);...

We are given a list of tasks Z and a population divided into several groups X j of equal size. Performing one task z requires constituting a team with exactly one member x j from every group. There is a cost (or reward) for participation: if type x j chooses task z, he receives p j (z);...

In this paper, we give the necessary and sufficient conditions that characterize the individual excess demand function when it depends smoothly on prices and endowments. A given function is an excess demand function if and only if it satisfies, in addition to Walras’ law and zero homogeneity...