effects in a duopoly setting. We demonstrate that the value of a firm and its entry decision behave differently with risk …A monopolist typically defers entry into an industry as both price uncertainty and the level of risk aversion increase …. By contrast, the presence of a rival typically hastens entry under risk neutrality. Here, we examine these two opposing …

We study the development of a duopoly industry -evolution of firm capacities and competitive behavior- in a continuous … industry investment occurs earlier than socially optimal and the first entrant takes more risk than socially optimal. While …

This paper investigates the interactions between preemptive competition and leverage in a duopoly market. We … firms to finance their investments by debt. Our findings are that the second mover always leaves the duopoly market before … the value of a firm and accelerate investment, even in the presence of preemptive competition. Notably, financing …

This paper investigates the interactions between preemptive competition and leverage. We find that the second mover … always leaves the duopoly market before the first mover, although the leader may exit before the followerfs entry. We also … preemptive competition. In addition to the case with optimal capital structure, we analyze a case with financing constraints that …

We study the development of a duopoly in a continuous-time model of capacity investment under no commitment by firms …

We study the development of a duopoly industry - evolution of firm capacities and competitive behavior - in a … the first industry investment occurs earlier than socially optimal and the first entrant takes more risk than socially …

duopoly with aggregate demand uncertainty. We find that limited liability and investment irreversibility is likely to produce … obligations in adverse states. However, market conditions themselves become endogenous in a duopoly since the quantity decisions … consequently monopolize the market. Therefore, the model of this paper explains predatory behavior in a duopoly without invoking …