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STABLE COALITION STRUCTURES UNDER RESTRICTED COALITIONAL CHANGES

FUNAKI, YUKIHIKO; YAMATO, TAKEHIKO - In: International Game Theory Review (IGTR) 16 (2014) 03, pp. 1450006-1

formation games. We propose a stability concept for a coalition structure, called sequentially stability, when only bilateral … sequential stability of the grand coalition structure as well as sufficient conditions for which the efficient grand coalition …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010765576

Coalition formation among farsighted agents

HERINGS, Jean - Jacques; MAULEON, Ana; VANNETELBOSCH, … - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), … - 2010

the relationship between farsighted stability and other concepts such as the largest consistent set and the von Neumann …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008642218

Coalition Formation among Farsighted Agents

Herings, P. Jean-Jacques; Mauleon, Ana; Vannetelbosch, … - In: Games 1 (2010) 3, pp. 286-298

of coalition structures and we study the relationship between farsighted stability and other concepts such as the largest …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008682977

Allocating value among farsighted players in network formation

CARAYOL, Nicolas; DELILLE, Remi; VANNETELBOSCH, Vincent - Groupe de Recherche en Économie Théorique et … - 2014

We propose a concept to study the stability of social and economic networks when players are farsighted and allocations …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010741320

Allocating value among farsighted players in network formation

CARAYOL, Nicolas; DELILLE, Rémy; VANNETELBOSCH, Vincent - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), … - 2014

We propose a concept to study the stability of social and economic networks when players are farsighted and allocations …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010752809

Connections Among Farsighted Agents

Vannetelbosch, Vincent; Grandjean, Gilles; Mauleon, Ana - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2009

We study the stability of social and economic networks when players are farsighted. In particular, we examine whether …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005008046

Connections among farsighted agents

GANDJEAN, Gilles; MAULEON, Ana; VANNETELBOSCH, Vincent - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), … - 2009

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008550182

TOPS RESPONSIVENESS, STRATEGY-PROOFNESS AND COALITION FORMATION PROBLEMS

Alcalde, José; Revilla, Pablo - Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas (IVIE) - 2001

This paper introduces a property over agents' preferences, called Tops Responsiveness Condition. Such a property guarantees that the core in Hedonic Coalition Formation games is not empty. It is also shown that a mechanism exists that selects a stable allocation. It turns out that this...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005515913

Enemies and Friends in Hedonic Games : Individual Deviations, Stability and Manipulation

Dimitrov, D.A.; Sung, S.C. - Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research - 2004

We consider hedonic games with separable preferences, and explore the existence of stable coalition structures if only individual deviations are allowed.For two natural subdomains of separable preferences, namely preference domains based on (1) aversion to enemies and (2) appreciation of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011092320

COLLABORATIVE ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT: A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

BENCHEKROUN, HASSAN; LONG, NGO VAN - In: International Game Theory Review (IGTR) 14 (2012) 04, pp. 1240002-1

the various concepts of coalitional stability, such as internal and external stability and far-sighted stability in the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010883245