We present a comprehensive theory of large games in which players have names and determinate social-types and/or biological traits, and identify through four decisive examples, essentially based on a matching-pennies type game, pathologies arising from the use of a Lebesgue interval for...

This paper elucidates the conceptual role that independent randomization plays in non-cooperative game theory. In the context of large (atomless) games in normal form, we present precise formalizations of the notions of a mixed strategy equilibrium (MSE), and of a randomized strategy equilibrium...

We present a comprehensive theory of large games in which players have names and determinate social-types and/or biological traits, and identify through four decisive examples, essentially based on a matching-pennies type game, pathologies arising from the use of a Lebesgue interval for player's...

We present a comprehensive theory of large non-anonymous games in which agents have a name and a determinate social-type and/or biological trait to resolve the dissonance of a (matching-pennies type) game with an exact pure-strategy Nash equilibrium with finite agents, but without one when...

A comprehensive theory of large strategic games with (socioeconomic and biological) traits (LSGT) has recently been presented in Khan et al. (2012, 2013), and we present a reformulation pertaining to large distributional games with traits (LDGT).

A comprehensive theory of large strategic games with (socioeconomic and biological) traits (LSGT) has recently been presented in Khan et al. (2012 a and b), and in this paper, we present a reformulation pertaining to large distributional games with traits (LDGT). In addition to a generalization...

It has remained an open question as to whether the results of Milgrom-Weber [Milgrom, P.R., Weber, R.J., 1985. Distributional strategies for games with incomplete information. Mathematics of Operations Research 10, 619-632] are valid for action sets with a countably infinite number of elements...