Reciprocity can be a powerful motivation for human behaviour. Scholars argue that it is relevant in the context of private provision of public goods. We examine whether reciprocity can resolve the associated coordination problem. The interaction of reciprocity with cost-sharing is critical....

Reciprocity can be a powerful motivation for human behaviour. Scholars argue that it is relevant in the context of private provision of public goods. We examine whether reciprocity can resolve the associated coordination problem. The interaction of reciprocity with cost-sharing is critical....

Reciprocity can be a powerful motivation for human behaviour. Scholars argue that it is relevant in the context of private provision of public goods. We examine whether reciprocity can resolve the associated coordination problem. The interaction of reciprocity with cost-sharing is critical....

An individual’s contribution to a public good may be seen by others as a signal of attributes such as generosity or wealth. An individual may, therefore, choose their contribution so as to send an appropriate signal to others. In this paper we question how the inferences made by others will...

Many fundraisers report donations using categories such as more than £ 1000, more than £ 10,000, etc. One naturally wonders how we should categorise donations and whether categorising raises more than simple uncategorised reporting. To answer these questions, we employ a signalling game...

In this paper we analyse the effect that naive agents (those who take behaviour at "face value") have on the nature of social norms. After reviewing the use of signalling models to model conformity, we argue in favour of modelling naive inferences in tandem with standard Bayes rational...

Many charities report donations using categories. We question whether such category reporting increases donations in a signalling game where a donor is either generous or not generous. Conditions are derived under which category reporting will increase giving or decrease giving. Category...

Individuals often have legitimate but publicly unobservable reasons for not partaking in cooperative social endeavours. This means others who lack legitimate reasons may then have the opportunity to behave uncooperatively, i.e. free-ride, and be indistinguishable from those with legitimate...

In a signalling model of conformity, we demonstrate that naïve observers, those that take actions at face value, constrain the set of actions that can possibly be social norms. With rational observers many actions can be norms, but with naïve observers only actions close to that preferred by...

Many fundraisers report donations using categories such as more than £ 1000, more than £ 10,000 etc. One naturally wonders how we should categorise donations and whether category reporting can raise more funds than simple uncategorised reporting. To shed light on these questions, we employ a...