This paper presents a model in which agents choose an action and a time at which to take the action. The authors show that, when agents choose when to act, their decisions become clustered together, giving the appearance of an information cascade even though information is actually being used...

We examine communication in laboratory games with asymmetric information. Sellers know true asset qualities. Potential buyers only know the quality distribution. Prohibiting communication, we document the degree of adverse selection. Then we examine two alternative communication mechanisms....

In this study, the authors report the results from laboratory asset markets designed to test the rational expectations hypothesis that markets aggregate and transmit the information of differentially informed traders. After documenting evidence in favor of the rational expectations model, they...

We propose a measure of managerial ability, based on managers' efficiency in generating revenues, which is available for a large sample of firms and outperforms existing ability measures. We find that our measure is strongly associated with manager fixed effects and that the stock price...

We examine the relation between internal control quality and the accuracy of management guidance. Consistent with managers in firms with ineffective internal controls relying on erroneous internal management reports when forming guidance, we document less accurate guidance among firms reporting...

We investigate the stock returns subsequent to quarterly earnings surprises, where the benchmark for an earnings surprise is the consensus analyst forecast. By defining the surprise relative to an analyst forecast rather than a time-series model of expected earnings, we document returns...