We model the failed bank resolution process as a repeated game between a utility-maximizing government resolution authority (RA) and a profit-maximizing banking industry. Limits to resolution technology and political/economic pressure create incentives for the RA to bail out failed complex...

We assess the effects of geographic expansion on bank efficiency using cost and profit efficiency for over 7,000 U.S. banks, 1993-1998. We find that parent organizations exercise some control over the efficiency of their affiliates, although this control tends to dissipate with distance to the...

This paper reviews the merits of the various techniques used by authorities when resolving individual or widespread bank failures in developed and emerging market economies. In particular, the various banking crisis resolution techniques available to the authorities are classified and then...

The Basel III Accord of December 2010, aiming to reduce the chances of systemic financial crises, included provisions regulating the liquid assets held by financial institutions. The Accord included provisions requiring financial institutions to maintain liquidity buffers: stocks of liquid...

This paper analyzes the role of expected income in entrepreneurial borrowing. We claim that poorer individuals are safer borrowers because they place more value on the relationship with the bank. We study the dynamics of a monopolistic bank granting loans and taking deposits from overlapping...

The paper derives optimal capital requirements, when the bank’s quality is private information. The supervisor can inspect the bank and punish the undercapitalized one with recapitalization and downsizing. The cost of bank’s capital and its ability to sell its assets are crucial for the...