In this paper we report results from a comparison of numerically calibrated game theoretic integrated assessment models that explore stability and performance of international coalitions for climate change mitigation. Specifically, by means of this ensemble of models we are able to identify...

type="main" <p>We investigate how different designs of carbon offset mechanisms, like the Kyoto Protocol's Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), affect the success of self-enforcing climate treaties. In a game-theoretic numerical model of coalition formation we find that participation in the agreement...</p>

To study the stability of coalitions in the standard game theoretic model of international environmental agreements, two alternative concepts are used: potential internal stability and core stability. Both concepts make use of the possibility of reallocating payoffs within a coalition through...

MIND is a hybrid model incorporating several energy related sectors in an endogenous growth model of the world economy. This model structure allows a better understanding of the linkages between the energy sectors and the macro-economic environment. We perform a sensitivity analysis and...

This paper presents a model of international environmental agreements in which cooperation between asymmetric countries can arise through pure self-interest. It demonstrates how emissions trading creates economic surplus by exploiting asymmetries. This surplus can be distributed via the...

This paper takes the ‘policy failure’ in establishing a global carbon price for efficient emissions reduction as a starting point and analyzes to what extent technology policies can be a reasonable second-best approach. From a supply-side perspective, carbon capture and storage (CCS)...

Fiscal considerations may shift governmental priorities away from environmental concerns: Finance ministers face strong demand for public expenditures such as infrastructure investments but they are constrained by international tax competition. We develop a multi-region model of tax competition...

We investigate conditions that amplify market failures in energy innovations, and suggest optimal policy instruments to address them. Using an intertemporal general equilibrium model we show that ‘small’ market imperfections may trigger a several decades lasting dominance of an incumbent...

This paper presents a stylized international environmental agreements game with two regions differing in their preference for environmental quality. If side payments are allowed, cooperation can increase the payoffs accruing to both regions. However, cooperation can be impeded by asymmetric...