We develop a model of matching from firms' perspectives and draw resulting conclusions for the macro-dynamics of an economy. The key insight is that firms may wish to hire workers that are bad matches (having low productivity) in high-demand states, even if the worker must be hired to a long-run...

Each year, hundreds of thousands of children in the U.S. are victims of child maltreatment. Experts recommend behavioral, skill-based parent training programs as a strategy for the prevention of child abuse and neglect. These programs can be enhanced using innovative technology strategies. This...

We examine the spread of a disease or behavior through a social network. In particular, we analyze how infection rates depend on the distribution of degrees (numbers of links) among the nodes in the network. We introduce new techniques using first- and second order stochastic dominance...

There is a wealth of research demonstrating that agents process information with the aid of categories. In this paper we study this phenomenon in two parts. First, we build a model of how experiences are sorted into categories and how categorization affects decision making. Second, in a series...

We examine the formation of networks among a set of players whose payoffs depend on the structure of the network. We focus on games where players may bargain by promising or demanding transfer payments when forming links. We examine several variations of the transfer/bargaining aspect of link...

We study all-pay auctions (or wars of attrition), where the highest bidder wins an object, but all bidders pay their bids. We consider such auctions when two bidders alternate in raising their bids and where all aspects of the auction are common knowledge including bidders' valuations. We...

We characterize strategy-proof social choice functions when individual have strictly quasi-concave, continuous and satiated utility functions on convex subsets |R^l, representing preferences for the provision of l pure public goods. When specialized to the case l=1, these assumptions amount to...

Consider an auction in which k identical objects are sold to n k bidders who each have a value for one object which can have both private and common components to it. Private information concerning the common component of the object is not exogenously given, but rather endogenous and bidders...