We construct a hybrid, economic indicator of the sustainability of global well-being, which is more inclusive than existing indicators and incorporates an environmentally pessimistic, physical constraint on global warming. Our methodology extends the World Bank's Adjusted Net Saving (ANS)...

Dr Jack Pezzey presented Neither the Rock nor the Hard Place: Balancing the Politics and the Economics of Emissions Control at a seminar in December 2005. Using greenhouse gas control as an example, Dr Pezzey's seminar argued for a pragmatic use of emission taxes and tradeable permits

We give empirical welfare results for global greenhouse gas emission control, using the first multiparty model to combine tax-versus-trading under uncertainties with revenue recycling. Including multiple parties greatly reduces the welfare advantage of an emissions tax over emissions (permit)...

Whalley and Wigle (1991b) use a static, six-region, perfect competition, general equilibrium model to explore various global carbon tax policies designed to cut CO2 emissions. Their program is used here to model unilateral carbon taxes applied by large regions such as the EC or the OECD. Sample...

We survey the history of carbon taxation, the range of market-based instruments (MBIs) of environmental control, and the state of the double dividend debate, in order to suggest directions for future research into MBIs. Returning MBI revenues as lower distortionary taxes rather than as lump sums...

We estimate and compare two empirical measures of the weak sustainability of an economy for the first time: the change in augmented green net national product (GNNP), and the interest on augmented genuine savings (GS). Yearly calculations are given for each measure for Scotland during 1992-99....

Under ideally competitive conditions, both controlling pollution by price (using a combined charge-subsidy scheme) and controlling it by quantity (using a marketable permit scheme) can achieve short- and long-run efficiency and also political acceptability, provided that both schemes embody the...

We compare three different views on the long runefficiencies of emission taxes which includethresholds (inframarginalexemptions), and of tradeable emission permitswhere some permits areinitially free. The differences are caused bydifferent assumptions aboutwhether thresholds and free permits...

We compare three different views on the long run efficiencies of emission taxes which include thresholds, and of tradable emission permits where some permits are initially free. The differences are caused by different assumptions about whether thresholds and free permits should be subsidies...