We develop a model in which competition in the labor market may produce worker-firm matches that are inferior to those obtained in the absence of competition. This result contrasts with the conventional wisdom that competition among employers allocates scarce talent efficiently. In a model in...

We develop a model of relational contracts with moral hazard and asymmetric persistent information about an employee's type. We find that the form of the optimal contract depends on the job characteristics as well as the distribution of employees' talent. Bonus contracts are more likely to be...

We offer a model that combines a knowledge based organizational structure with progressive learning of employees’ talent. We show that higher span of control is associated with better selected managers, higher wages, higher probability to be promoted, and higher turn-over in the early career...

Agents who work in teams may be better informed about each other's effort than the employer. We analyse how the possibility for employees to write contracts on this information alters the incentives provided by the principal. We show that side-contracting is profitable for the employer when...

This paper proposes a theory of how employee-driven innovations are developed. An employee with private information about the value of his idea can create a spin-out, work in a division of the parent firm, or work for a spinoff of the parent firm. Developing an idea in a spinoff allows the...

The paper develops a model where the structure of organizations is a choice variable for firms and depends on conditions in the labour market. It shows that an increase in the supply of skilled labour may lead firms to adopt organizations with less hierarchical levels. This organizational change...

Chapter 1 of this paper argues that punlic sector resources in developing countries are insufficient to finance demand for investment in increasingly integrated infrastructure services. Chapter 2 discusses the role of reforms in public enterprises providing infrastructure services. Chapter 3...

Many corporations reward their outside directors with a modest fee for each board meeting they attend. Using a large panel data set on director attendance behavior in publicly-listed firms for the period 1996-2003, we provide robust evidence that directors are less likely to have attendance...

Many governance reform proposals are based on the view that boards have been too friendly to executives, for example, by awarding them excessive pay. Although boards are often on friendly terms with executives, it is less clear that they have systematically failed to function in the interests of...