Pratt [1964] establishes that a more risk-averse individual in the Arrow-Pratt sense has a higher compensating risk premium for full insurance, but no comparable result has been established for partial insurance. Ross [1981] shows that a more risk-averse individual in the Arrow-Pratt sense may...

We analyze the optimal choices of agents with utility functions whose derivatives alternate in sign, an important class that includes most of the functions commonly used in economics and finance (Mixed Risk Aversion, MRA, Caballé and Pomansky, 1996). We propose a comparative mixed risk aversion...

In this paper we address the problem of determining whether adding independent risks or subdividing them is a good substitute for insurance. Despite the fact that accepting more i.i.d. risks increases total risk, it is shown that some risk-averse decision makers can rationally reduce their...

We study the willingness to pay for reductions in health risks when people do not evaluate probabilities linearly, as is commonly assumed in elicitations of willingness to pay, but weight probabilities, as is commonly observed in empirical studies of decision under risk. We show that for the...

What are the determinants of the optimal level of effort to reduce the probability of a loss to occur? Whereas most of the literature on this question focused on risk aversion, we show that the concept of prudence (i.e., a positive third derivative of the utility function) is essential to answer...