We characterize and compare closed-loop (feedback) price and quantity strategies within a full-fledged dynamic model of oligopolistic competition in which production requires exploitation of a renewable productive asset. Unlike previous papers on the strategic exploitation of productive assets,...

We derive a feedback equilibrium of a dynamic Cournot game where production requires exploitation of a renewable asset. As in the classical Cournot model, quantity-setting firms compete in the same market for a given homogeneous good. We show that, when the asset stock grows sufficiently fast,...

We propose an infinite-horizon quantity-setting differential game with learning spillovers and organizational forgetting to analyze the optimal management decisions affecting the evolution of the stock of know-how, and, in turn, the dynamics of productive efficiency. Specifically, we study the...

Theory predicts that optimal effective corporation tax rates will be negatively related to industry specific sunk costs, and hence industry concentration. Governments should tax industries with monopolistic power softly. Evidence suggests that this Schumpeterian (1942) principle of corporate...

The seminal paper by Abreu (1986) is revisited to reassess the optimality of one-shot stick-and-carrot punishments. It is shown that there are admissible conditions under which the use of grim trigger strategies with an infinite Nash reversion is more efficient than implementing Abreu’s penal...

We take a new look at the comparison between the Stackelberg equilibrium and the Cournot equilibrium. We show that, when the elasticity of the inverse market demand equals the curvature of the inverse market demand weighted by the Lerner Index, a generic Stackelberg leader sets the same quantity...

Theory predicts that optimal effective corporation tax rates will benegatively related to industry specific sunk costs, and hence industryconcentration. Governments should tax industries with monopolistic powersoftly. Evidence suggests that this Schumpeterian (1942) principle ofcorporate...

We compare two-stage Stackleberg with Cournot equilibrium under the assumption of quantity competition and homogeneous goods.  We show that, when the curvature of the inverse market demand equals the total number of firms in the industry, the outcome of the two games coincides.

In this paper, we aim at investigating from a game-theory perspective whether trade liberalization can promote a collusive two-way trade. We show that, under Cournot competition, economic integration is anti-competitive if collusive trade is a possible outcome of the repeated game; under price...