In this paper we develop a model to analyze, in a dynamic framework, how countries join international environmental agreements (IEAs). In the model, where countries suffer from the same environmental damage as a result of the total global emissions, a non-signatory country decides its emissions...

This note deals with time-consistency and agreeability, two dynamic individual rationality concepts, in special linear-quadratic differential games. Conditions ensuring their satisfaction are derived and a link between sustainability of cooperation and fair sharing of cooperation surplus is...

The paper surveys the literature on cooperative advertising in marketing channels (supply chains) using game theoretic methods. During the last decade, in particular, this literature has expanded considerably and has studied static as well as dynamic settings. The survey is divided into two main...

We introduce learning in a dynamic game of international pollution, with ecological uncertainty. We characterize and compare the feedback non-cooperative emissions strategies of players when the players do not know the distribution of ecological uncertainty but they gain information (learn)...

We investigate the dynamic effect that the Tandroy's unsustainable practices have on the forest. The Tandroy people live in Androy, a region located in the southern part of Madagascar. They are mainly an agricultural and cattle herding society whose subsistence relies on the slash-and-burn...

In this paper, we consider a duopoly competing on quantity, where firms can invest in R&D to control their emissions. We distinguish between efforts carried out to acquire first-hand knowledge (inventive R&D) and efforts made to develop an absorptive capacity to be able to capture part of the...

We investigate the dynamic effect that the Tandroy's unsustainable practices have on the forest. The Tandroy people live in Androy, a region located in the southern part of Madagascar. They are mainly an agricultural and cattle herding society whose subsistence relies on the slash-and-burn...

We consider a two-period closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) game where a remanufacturer appropriates of the returns’ residual value and decides whether to exclusively manage the end-of-use product collection or to outsource it to either a retailer or a third-service provider (3P). We determine...