This paper proposes a class of independence axioms for simple acts. By introducing the E-cominimum independence axiom that is stronger than the comonotonic independence axiom but weaker than the independence axiom, we provide a new axiomatization theorem of simple acts within the framework of...

This paper proposes a class of independence axioms for simple acts. By introducing the <InlineEquation ID="IEq1"> <EquationSource Format="TEX">$${\mathcal {E}}$$</EquationSource> <EquationSource Format="MATHML"> <math xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink"> <mi mathvariant="script">E</mi> </math> </EquationSource> </InlineEquation>-cominimum independence axiom that is stronger than the comonotonic independence axiom but weaker than the independence axiom, we provide a new axiomatization theorem of simple acts...</equationsource></equationsource></inlineequation>

The purpose of this paper is twofold. First, we generalize Kajii et al. (J Math Econ 43:218–230, <CitationRef CitationID="CR16">2007</CitationRef>) and provide a condition under which for a game <InlineEquation ID="IEq1"> <EquationSource Format="TEX">$$v$$</EquationSource> <EquationSource Format="MATHML"> <math xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink"> <mi>v</mi> </math> </EquationSource> </InlineEquation>, its Möbius inverse is equal to zero within the framework of the <InlineEquation ID="IEq2"> <EquationSource Format="TEX">$$k$$</EquationSource> <EquationSource Format="MATHML"> <math xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink"> <mi>k</mi> </math> </EquationSource> </InlineEquation>-modularity of <InlineEquation ID="IEq3"> <EquationSource Format="TEX">$$v$$</EquationSource> <EquationSource Format="MATHML"> <math xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink"> <mi>v</mi> </math> </EquationSource> </InlineEquation> for <InlineEquation ID="IEq4"> <EquationSource Format="TEX">$$k \ge 2$$</EquationSource> <EquationSource Format="MATHML"> <math xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink"> <mrow> <mi>k</mi>...</mo></mrow></math></equationsource></equationsource></inlineequation></equationsource></equationsource></inlineequation></equationsource></equationsource></inlineequation></equationsource></equationsource></inlineequation></citationref>

This paper proposes a class of weak additivity concepts for an operator on the set of real valued functions on a finite state space Ω, which include additivity and comonotonic additivity as extreme cases. Let E ⊆ 2Ω be a collection of subsets of Ω. Two functions x and y on Ω are...

This paper proposes a class of weak additivity concepts for an operator on the set of real valued functions on a finite state space \omega, which include additivity and comonotonic additivity as extreme cases. Let \epsilon be a collection of subsets of \omega. Two functions x and y on \omega are...

The objective of this study is to design a laboratory experiment to explore the effect of ambiguity on a subject’s search behavior in a finite-horizon sequential search model. In so doing, we employ a strategy to observe the potential trend of reservation points that is usually unobserved. We...

Using a simple framework of Cooper and John (1988) and Cooper (1999), this paper derives the conditions under which overconfidence and underconfidence of agents lead to Pareto improvement. We show that an agent’s overconfidence in a game exhibiting strategic complementarity and positive...

Extending the Grossman [12] model of health capital into a stochastic one, we analyze how the presence of Knightian uncertainty about the efficacy of health care affects the optimal health investment behavior of individuals. Using Gilboa and Schmeidler's [11] model of maxmin expected utility...

This paper studies the effects of Knightian uncertainty, or ambiguity, on entrepreneurial choice. By distinguishing between risk and ambiguity, we first show that ambiguity aversion makes it less likely that an individual will become an entrepreneur. It is also shown that an increase in...

In order to describe partial cooperation structures, this paper introduces complete coalition structures as sets of feasible coalitions. A complete coalition structure has a property that, for any coalition, if each pair of players in the coalition belongs to some feasible coalition contained in...